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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-2015 
___________ 
 
LEONARD COTTRELL; SANDRA HENON; WILLIAM REEVES; GEORGE 
HERMAN; SIMON NAZZAL; CAROL FREBURGER; JACK LIGGETT; PATRICIA 
BOUGH; MACK BROWN; DOLORES GILLESPIE; DEBORAH HARRINGTON; 
ROBERT INGINO; EDWARD ROGERS, JR.; DEBORAH RUSIGNULOLO; 
DOROTHY STOKES; JOSEPHINE TROCCOLI; HURIE WHITFIELD; THOMAS 
LAYLOFF; CAROLYN TANNER; PATSY TATE; JOHN SUTTON; JESUS 
RENTERIA; GLENDELIA FRANCO; NADINE LAMPKIN, on behalf of themselves 
and all others similarly situated, 
   
   Appellants 
     
v. 
 
ALCON LABORATORIES; ALCON RESEARCH LTD; FALCON 
PHARMACEUTICALS LTD; SANDOZ INC.; ALLERGAN INC, RP; ALLERGAN 
USA INC; ALLERGAN SALES LLC; PFIZER INC; VALEANT 
PHARMACEUTICALS INTERNATIONAL; BAUSCH & LOMB INC; ATON 
PHARMA INC; MERCK & CO INC; MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP; PRASCO 
LLC; AKORN INC 
_________________________________ 
 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 14-cv-5859) 
____________________________________ 
 
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING 
____________________________________ 
 
 
Present:  SMITH, Chief Judge, AMBRO, CHAGARES, JORDAN, SHWARTZ, 
RESTREPO, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
 
                                              
 Judge Roth’s vote is limited to panel rehearing only. 
 Chief Judge Smith, Judge Ambro and Judge Jordan would grant rehearing en banc.   
 The petition for rehearing filed by Appellees in the above-entitled case having 
been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this Court and to all the 
other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who 
concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the judges of the 
circuit in regular service not having voted for rehearing, the petition for rehearing by the 
panel and the Court en banc, is denied. 
 
        By the Court, 
         
        s/ L. Felipe Restrepo 
        Circuit Judge 
 
Date:  December 22, 2017 
MB/cc: All Counsel of Record 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
No. 16-2015 COTTRELL v. ALCON LABORATORIES  
 
OPINION DISSENTING SUR DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING EN 
BANC 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge, with whom AMBRO and JORDAN, Circuit Judges, join. 
 
Plaintiffs would prefer that the eye drops prescribed for them be sold in a different 
type of packaging. The wisdom of their preference, however, is better left tested in the 
marketplace, not in this Court. Creating a disparity with one of our sister circuits, the 
Majority’s opinion reasons otherwise. Because I believe Plaintiffs’ unfulfilled 
preferences do not constitute an “injury” that this Court can evaluate in light of Article III 
of the Constitution, I respectfully file this opinion dissenting sur denial of rehearing en 
banc.  
I. 
Plaintiffs are consumers of prescription eye drop medications manufactured and 
distributed by Defendants. The medication is sold in bottles designed with dropper tips 
that dispense more liquid than the relevant portion of the human eye can hold at any one 
time. Since the entire amount of each drop cannot be contained within the eye—where it 
is pharmaceutically beneficial—the bottle’s design necessarily results in a portion of each 
drop being wasted. Arguing that this waste constitutes an unfair or unconscionable 
practice under state consumer protection statutes, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action 
complaint.  
Of course, Plaintiffs must have standing to bring their claim in federal court. To 
establish standing, Plaintiffs must show that they have: “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) 
that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to 
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 
1547 (2016). The Majority notes that the case at hand “centers on the ‘[f]irst and 
foremost’ of the three standing elements, injury in fact.” Maj. Op. at 162 (quoting 
Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1547).  
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To establish injury in fact, “a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an 
invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Ultimately holding that Plaintiffs 
successfully alleged an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing, the Majority 
was first required to “acknowledge that the Seventh Circuit held otherwise in a recent 
case concerning materially identical allegations against many of the same defendants.” 
Cottrell v. Alcon Laboratories, 874 F.3d 154, 165 (3rd Cir. 2017). In that case, the 
Seventh Circuit concluded that “[t]he fact that a seller does not sell the product that you 
want, or at the price you’d like to pay, is not an actionable injury.” Eike v. Allergan, Inc., 
850 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2017). The Seventh Circuit instead characterized such a claim as 
merely expressing “regret or disappointment.” Id. For reasons similar to those expressed 
by the Seventh Circuit in Eike, as well as those expressed by Judge Roth in her dissenting 
opinion in the case at hand, I would not hold Plaintiffs to have successfully established 
standing.  
II. 
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Roth concludes that the Majority “ignores clear 
law cautioning against recognizing Article III standing based on the types of conjectural 
allegations” advanced by Plaintiffs. Cottrell, 874 F.3d at 172 (Roth, J, dissenting). One 
precedent that the Majority’s approach conflicts with is Finkelman v. National Football 
League, 810 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2016). Like Judge Roth, I am of the opinion that 
Finkelman “all but decides this case.” Cottrell, 874 F.3d at 172 (Roth, J, dissenting). 
In Finkelman, this Court held that a plaintiff did not have standing to sue under the 
theory that the National Football League’s (NFL’s) ticketing policy artificially inflated 
the price of Super Bowl tickets. Finkelman, 810 F.3d 197. Like Plaintiffs in the case at 
hand, Finkelman brought a class action lawsuit arguing that he had suffered an economic 
harm. Specifically, Finkelman argued that if the NFL had offered more tickets to the 
general public—rather than “league insiders”—then Finkelman and other similarly 
situated individuals would have been able to purchase Super Bowl tickets at a lower 
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price. Id. This Court concluded that Finkelman’s theory rested on “pure conjecture about 
what the ticket resale market might have looked like if the NFL had sold its tickets 
differently. Article III injuries require a firmer foundation.” Id. at 201. 
Similar to the theory presented in Finkelman, Plaintiffs’ theory rests on “pure 
conjecture” as to what the eye drop market might have looked like if Defendants had sold 
their product in different packaging.1 Attempting to distinguish its holding from 
Finkelman, the Majority notes that Plaintiffs’ hypothetical marketplace only requires 
theorizing “the reduced size of the bottle dropper tip [a]s the only change from the status 
quo.” Cottrell, 874 F.3d at 169 (emphasis in original). In attempting to distinguish this 
case from Finkelman, however, the Majority draws attention to the very reason why the 
two cases conflict. As Judge Roth writes, “contrary to the Majority's assertion, the 
[P]laintiffs' pricing theory does in fact depend on exactly the sort of presumption rejected 
by us and by other courts—namely, the presumption that no other aspects of the market 
would change once the defendants’ conduct did.” Cottrell, 874 F.3d at 173-74 (Roth, J, 
dissenting). 
 To put it differently, Plaintiffs’ theory requires this Court to imagine a 
hypothetical marketplace in which Defendants are hamstrung from adapting to any new 
market conditions that might arise from the emergence of innovative bottle designs. This 
theory requires us to assume, for example, that a Defendant would decide to internalize 
the costs associated with designing, manufacturing, and marketing new packaging instead 
                                              
1 On remand, Finkelman amended his complaint to add detailed information describing 
how the secondary ticket market specifically functioned. In reviewing his amended 
complaint, this Court held Finkelman to only then have standing because the amended 
complaint did more than just allege higher prices—it “alleged a causal chain justifying 
why” ticket prices were higher. Finkelman v. Nat'l Football League, No. 16-4087, 2017 
WL 6395503, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec. 15, 2017) (emphasis in original). Unlike the detailed 
information in Finkelman’s amended complaint, Plaintiffs in the instant case provide only 
conclusory allegations to support their theory. Finkelman’s amended complaint is 
therefore distinguishable from the instant case, and does not change the import of this 
Court’s original holding in Finkelman v. National Football League, 810 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
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of raising the price it offers to consumers. Further, even if a Defendant were to internalize 
those costs, Plaintiffs’ theory also requires us to assume that a Defendant would not 
charge more for a bottle capable of delivering more doses. It might just as easily be the 
case, however, that new packaging would result in Plaintiffs paying higher prices for 
their treatment. Therefore, to paraphrase Finkelman, “while it might be the case that the 
[Defendants’ bottle design] increased . . . prices . . . it might also be the case that it had 
no effect on the . . . market.” Finkelman, 810 F.3d 200 (emphasis in original). Similar to 
Finkelman, where this Court had “no way of knowing whether the NFL’s withholding of 
tickets would have had the effect of increasing or decreasing prices,” Plaintiffs’ theory 
requires us to speculate as to the effects of new packaging. Id. Doing so conflicts with 
Finkelman, which made clear that “speculation is not enough to sustain Article III 
standing.” Id. 
III. 
 I am also concerned that the Majority's opinion could encourage courts to ignore 
the expert conclusions of administrative agencies. As the Seventh Circuit wrote in Eike, 
“[t]he defendants' large eye drops have been approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA)—in other words have been determined to be safe and effective for 
treatment of glaucoma.” Eike, 850 F.3d at 318. If Plaintiffs believe that smaller drops will 
be “even more effective, and also cheaper,” these are matters that plaintiffs must take up 
with the FDA, since a court “cannot bypass the agency and make its own evaluation of 
the safety and efficacy of an unconventionally sized eye drop.” Id. Although I would still 
not hold Plaintiffs to have shown standing even if Defendants did not have to submit new 
packaging designs to a lengthy FDA approval process, courts should hesitate before 
permitting plaintiffs to use the federal judiciary as a tool to second-guess factual 
decisions made by agencies that are presumed to be subject-matter experts.   
IV. 
 Finally, I am concerned that the Majority’s opinion could play mischief with our 
standing jurisprudence beyond the class action field. By allowing plaintiffs to establish 
standing simply by speculating about the additional efficiencies they might have captured 
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had a defendant acted in accordance with the rules of a plaintiff’s hypothetical 
marketplace, I fear that everyday business decisions may be subject to litigation by 
creative plaintiffs capable of theorizing a way that those business decisions could have 
been made to serve plaintiffs more efficiently. Perhaps as a way to preemptively limit its 
holding, the Majority repeatedly stresses that the case at hand involves consumer 
protection statutes prohibiting “unfair” or “unconscionable” conduct. Cottrell, 874 F.3d 
at 161, 165-67, 169-70. Although this language may signal the Majority’s desire to 
restrict its holding to “unfairness” claims, I am concerned that the Majority provides no 
clear rationale to so confine its interpretation of Article III. I would hold that Article III 
limits this Court’s ability to engage in the type of speculation that Plaintiffs’ theory calls 
for regardless of whether a plaintiff roots its claim in unfairness, deception, or any other 
cause of action.  
* * * 
 In light of the concerns cited above, I would join Judge Roth in holding that 
Plaintiffs have not established that they have standing to bring their claim in federal 
court.  
